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RAS Social ScienceSotsialogicheski issledovania

  • ISSN (Print) 0132-1625
  • ISSN (Online)3034-6010

Natural Computations and Artificial Intelligence

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PII
S023620070019511-9-
DOI
10.31857/S023620070019511-9
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Igor Mikhailov
Volume/ Edition
Volume 33 / Issue 2
Pages
65-83
Abstract

The research program focused on the analysis of computational approaches to natural and artificial intelligence is one of four accepted for implementation at the Center for the Philosophy of Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences of the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. Presumably, it should become a direction of interdisciplinary research at the crossroad of philosophy, cognitive psychology, cognitive and social neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. The working hypothesis proposed for discussion attended by the relevant specialists is as follows: if an acceptable computational theory of mind appears, we will be able to restrict our research to a simple scientific ontology describing only parts of a physical implementation of computational algorithms, adding a relevant version of computational mathematics thereto. Another hypothesis proposed is that there is an essential ontological intersection between the mechanisms underlying human cognitive abilities and their social organization, both of which serving as an implementation medium for complex distributed cognitive computations. Particularly those which are associated with social organization are responsible for logical and verbal (“rational”) cognitive abilities. As a result of some previous research, an ontology of nested distributed computational systems was generally formulated, which, as expected, can demonstrate significant heuristic potential if supplemented with an adequate mathematical apparatus. Since only individuals with certain cognitive abilities can be social agents, a philosophical problem arises: are cognitive abilities necessary or sufficient to involve their carriers in stable social interactions? In the first case, we have a weak thesis about the cognitive determination of sociality, in the second — the strong one. The choice between these positions is, too, a subject of future research.

Keywords
cognitive computations, artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, cognitive social neuroscience, scientific ontology, rationality, multi-agent systems
Date of publication
11.05.2022
Number of purchasers
12
Views
975

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