While the destruction of the architecture of arms control is under way, Russian-American relations are being aggravated, against the backdrop of the US withdrawing from the INF Treaty and starting a new Cold War with China, the problem of China’s nuclear potential unrestrained by any formal limiting agreements with regard to nuclear weapons is crucial. China is accused of undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime and international security, as well as of conducting a deliberate policy of freeriding by unconstrained buildup of its nuclear capabilities, while the leaders in this sphere — Russia and the United States — have lived under self-imposed mutual restrictions for many years. In this article, the author first explores China’s nuclear risks, which include the uncontrolled development of the US missile defense, high-precision conventional or potentially low-yield nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of the missile defense capabilities of its allies. Moreover, militarization of the Asia-Pacific region by the United States as part of the “Asia Pivot” strategy and its replacements poses a threat as well, since a conventional clash with China at certain points of conflict can lead to nuclear escalation. Then, the author considers the particulars of Chenese nuclear policy, which include maintaining the potential for minimal deterrence and guaranteed retaliation while pledging not to perform a nuclear strike first and refusing to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. To make its nuclear arsenal more survivable, China does not disclose the structure and locations of its strategic nuclear forces. Creating an atmosphere of incomplete information also has deep roots in Chinese strategic culture. Then, the author deliberates about the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which consists of a limited number of strategic-range ballistic missiles, as well as a significant number of medium, shorter, and intermediate dual-use missiles. He concludes that further improvement of the nuclear potential will be carried out along the lines of improving the quality of launchers, missile defense penetration aids, as well as MIRVing its missiles, modernizing the command and control and early warning systems. The author further talks about the efforts historically undertaken by China to strengthen the non-proliferation and arms control regime in the context of the international environment. This includes the obligation to refrain from the first nuclear strike and a course towards minimal deterrence, calls for the international community to moderate its nuclear policy, joining the IAEA, NPT, the CWC, the BTWC and other treaties, the announcement of a moratorium on nuclear testing and its diligent execution, despite on unfavorable conditions and so on. Then, the author brings up proposals existing in the expert community on the possibilities of including China in negotiations on the abovementioned topics. The most important and effective arguably are the US-Chinese negotiations. The proposed negotiations aim either to clarify the position of the United States, or to come to a common understanding with China on such important issues as the US conditions for the first use, non-targeting of conventional weapons at nuclear facilities, targets, tasks and equipment of hypersonic weapons, dual-use missiles, joint storage of nuclear and non-nuclear munitions. In conclusion, the author writes that in modern international conditions, China will not participate in any legally binding restrictive agreements. In this regard, maintaining a constant dialogue and unilateral actions to increase confidence is of key importance. The lack of transparency of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is a serious obstacle to Russian-American cooperation in arms control. The balance of conventional weapons will play a significant role in ensuring strategic stability.