Lobbying and U.S. Sanctions: Statistical Analysis
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Lobbying and U.S. Sanctions: Statistical Analysis
Annotation
PII
S268667300008061-7-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Sergey Kostyayev 
Affiliation: Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences, RAS
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Edition
Pages
118-126
Abstract

The article is devoted to the question: how effective is lobbying as an instrument of U.S. sanctions removal? The main method is panel data random effects logistic regression. Panel data include 25 countries which have been under U.S. sanctions from 2001 to 2017. Dependent variable is sanctions status (present, absent). Independent variables are: number of consulting contracts in each year for each country, total amount of consulting spending in each year for each country, GDP, Polity 4, corruption perception index, presence of state sponsors of terrorism list. Binary logit is used because of binary dependent variable, random effects are used because of lack of variability in dependent variable for certain countries. Main conclusions: first, lobbying plays no statistically significant role in removal of sanctions, second, the bigger the GDP of a country, the less likely it gets under U.S. sanctions, third, presence on the list of state sponsors of terrorism reduces the likelihood of sanctions removal.

Keywords
lobbying, sanctions, corruption, terrorism, U.S. Africa, Middle East, Latin America, South East Asia, Central Asia
Acknowledgment
The Research is supported by Russian Basic Science Foundation: Lobbying and U.S. and E.U. Sanctions comparative, 2017-2019 No. 17-37-01001-opn-mol-A2.
Received
10.09.2019
Date of publication
20.01.2020
Number of purchasers
45
Views
1839
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0.0 (0 votes)
Previous versions
S268667300008061-7-1 Дата внесения правок в статью - 26.12.2019
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References

1. Danilina N.V., Kostyaev S.S., 2018. Lobbizm stran Afriki, Blizhnego Vostoka i sanktsii SShA i ES. SShA & Kanada: Ehkonomika, Politika, Kul'tura. № 12. S. 36–50. DOI: 10.31857/S032120680002701-5

2. Morgan T.C., Navin B., Yoshiharu K., 2014. Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science. No. 31 (5). P. 541-558. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271378 (accessed 13.09.2019).

3. Rosenberg E., 2016. The New Tools of Economic Warfare: Effects and Effectiveness of U.S. Financial Sanctions. Washington, D.C.: CNAS. 74 p.

4. Treisman D., 2007. What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 10. P. 211-244.

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